Economia Xina Geopolítica Sancions Rússia Comerç internacional Corea del Nord Kim Jong-un

Per què creix l’economia de Corea del Nord: Rússia, la Xina i sancions més febles

Les estimacions del Banc de Corea indiquen que el PIB nord-coreà va créixer un 3,1% el 2023 i un 3,7% el 2024. TLDR News analitza el paper de Rússia, la Xina i l’erosió de les sancions.

Corea del Nord continua sent un dels països més pobres i opacs del món, però les estimacions disponibles indiquen una recuperació econòmica real. El Banc de Corea calcula que el PIB nord-coreà va augmentar un 3,1% el 2023 i un 3,7% el 2024, després de la contracció i l’estancament de la pandèmia.

TLDR News Global identifica tres motors principals: els ingressos i recursos vinculats a la cooperació amb Rússia, la recuperació del comerç amb la Xina i una aplicació menys efectiva de les sancions internacionals. El repunt, però, no equival a prosperitat general ni resol la inseguretat alimentària.

Mesurar una economia que no publica el seu PIB

Corea del Nord no ofereix comptes nacionals verificables amb els estàndards habituals. La major part de les xifres provenen d’estimacions externes construïdes amb producció observada, comerç dels països socis, preus sud-coreans, imatges de satèl·lit i informació d’intel·ligència.

El mateix Banc de Corea adverteix que les seves estimacions utilitzen preus i ràtios de valor afegit de Corea del Sud. Serveixen per seguir la tendència interna, però no s’han de comparar directament amb el PIB d’altres països.

Les llums nocturnes aporten una pista complementària. El vídeo cita estudis que detecten més activitat lumínica, sobretot a Pyongyang, després de la pandèmia. Aquest indicador acostuma a correlacionar-se amb activitat econòmica, però té límits: una nova central elèctrica, una política d’enllumenat o una inversió concentrada a la capital poden augmentar la llum sense millorar igualment totes les llars.

Per això, «boom» és un titular més contundent que la dada. Un creixement pròxim al 3–4% des d’una base molt baixa pot ser important sense convertir Corea del Nord en una economia pròspera.

De l’avantatge inicial a l’autarquia i la fam

Després de la guerra de Corea, el Nord va industrialitzar-se amb ajuda soviètica i xinesa. Durant els primers anys, la producció per habitant probablement superava la del Sud. El model prioritzava indústria pesant, planificació estatal i suport del bloc comunista.

La trajectòria es va torçar quan va disminuir l’ajuda soviètica i Kim Il-sung va aprofundir en el juche, la doctrina d’autosuficiència. El país va reduir el comerç, però necessitava importar maquinària i energia. Als anys setanta es va endeutar als mercats internacionals, va patir impagaments i va perdre l’accés normal al crèdit.

El col·lapse de la Unió Soviètica va eliminar ajuda i petroli subvencionat. La crisi dels anys noranta va culminar en una fam devastadora, amb estimacions de mortalitat que varien enormement per la falta de dades.

En aquell període, l’Estat va perdre capacitat per controlar tota la distribució. Van créixer mercats informals que, tot i ser tolerats de manera irregular, van donar més pes als preus, al petit comerç i a iniciatives domèstiques. Aquesta economia paral·lela encara dificulta més qualsevol càlcul del PIB.

La pandèmia i el rebot del 2023 i 2024

Abans de la covid, les sancions aprovades després de les proves nuclears ja limitaven exportacions, energia, finançament i accés a tecnologia. El tancament gairebé total de la frontera durant la pandèmia va afegir un xoc molt més immediat.

El comerç amb la Xina es va desplomar. Van faltar fertilitzants i altres inputs, els tifons van perjudicar collites i el sistema sanitari va quedar sotmès a una forta pressió. El Banc de Corea estima una caiguda real del 4,5% el 2020, seguida d’un -0,1% el 2021 i un -0,2% el 2022.

El canvi arriba amb la reobertura:

  • 2023: creixement estimat del 3,1%;
  • 2024: creixement estimat del 3,7%;
  • expansió destacada de mineria, manufactura i construcció el 2024.

TLDR també assenyala noves centrals hidroelèctriques i obra pública. Són signes de recuperació de la capacitat inversora, encara que els anuncis estatals no permeten saber el cost, la qualitat o el rendiment de cada projecte.

Rússia: armes, tropes, treballadors i divises

La guerra d’Ucraïna ha convertit Rússia en un soci molt més valuós per a Pyongyang. Un equip multilateral format per onze governs va documentar el 2025 transferències d’armes, desplegament de personal nord-coreà i altres formes de cooperació prohibides per resolucions del Consell de Seguretat.

Per a Corea del Nord, aquesta relació pot aportar:

  • divises;
  • combustible i aliments;
  • tecnologia i equipament;
  • ocupació per a treballadors enviats a l’exterior;
  • suport polític i militar.

No hi ha una comptabilitat pública que permeti calcular quant representa tot això dins del PIB. Tampoc tots els pagaments han de ser monetaris. Una part pot arribar en forma de petroli, gra, assistència tècnica o cancel·lació d’obligacions.

El benefici econòmic per al règim és compatible amb un cost geopolític: reforça la capacitat militar russa i erosiona el sistema de sancions que havia d’impedir el finançament dels programes nuclear i balístic nord-coreans.

La Xina i unes sancions menys efectives

La Xina continua sent el centre del comerç nord-coreà. L’informe de KOTRA calcula que el 98% del comerç exterior registrat el 2024 va correspondre a la Xina. Aquell any, el comerç total va ser d’uns 2.700 milions de dòlars, un 2,6% menys que el 2023, però molt per sobre dels nivells de la frontera tancada.

Aquesta dada matisa l’expressió «el comerç va créixer»: la recuperació respecte de la pandèmia és clara, però el 2024 no va augmentar en termes totals. Les exportacions sí que van avançar un 10,9%, mentre que les importacions van baixar un 4,4%.

El vídeo argumenta que Pequín aplica les sancions amb menys rigor que el 2016 i 2017. Això facilita fluxos de béns, energia i components. Corea del Nord també es beneficia dels preus baixos d’alguns productes industrials xinesos, com plaques solars o vehicles elèctrics.

Alhora, l’ús creixent de sancions per part dels Estats Units i aliats ha impulsat xarxes alternatives de pagament, empreses pantalla, transbordaments marítims i comerç fora dels canals occidentals. Rússia i la Xina tenen menys incentius per cooperar amb la pressió econòmica occidental que fa una dècada.

Creixement no significa benestar

Pyongyang concentra inversió, electricitat i aparadors destinats a la població privilegiada i als visitants. Una capital més il·luminada no descriu necessàriament la vida a les províncies.

El Programa Mundial d’Aliments continua parlant d’inseguretat alimentària crònica. La seva estimació publicada, basada en dades anteriors, situa en 10,7 milions les persones desnodrides. La FAO assenyala que el clima va afavorir les collites principals del 2025, però també recorda els problemes estructurals: poca terra cultivable, fertilitzants insuficients, maquinària limitada i exposició a inundacions i sequeres.

Per tant, poden ser certes dues coses alhora:

  1. l’economia ha crescut amb força des del mínim pandèmic;
  2. milions de persones continuen amb mancances alimentàries i ingressos molt baixos.

La recuperació dona a Kim Jong-un més marge per finançar infraestructura, consum selectiu i armament. Aquesta és la principal conclusió geopolítica del vídeo: una Corea del Nord amb més socis, més divises i sancions menys efectives pot sostenir millor el règim i els seus programes militars, encara que la majoria de la població no visqui cap «boom».

La peça inclou un segment patrocinat per Ground News al final. El patrocini no afecta les xifres institucionals citades, però forma part del context comercial del vídeo.

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  1. 0:00 , obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova

    Every 5 years, North Korea holds a Workers' Party Congress. At the one before last in 2021, Kim Jong-un was a sorry sight. The economy was a mess, COVID was sweeping across the country, and things were so bad that Kim was forced to tearfully apologize for his failures. At the most recent one earlier this year, however, the vibes were very different. Kim triumphantly declared that North Korea was in a glorious and more prosperous era, promising quotes both sweets and bullets, with the implication being that North Korea's economy is doing well enough to both provide for its people and fund its nuke-centric military program. So, in this video, we're going to look at the North Korean economy and why it's apparently doing all right. >> [music] >> Trump has launched so many military interventions, it's kind of hard to keep track. So, in the latest issue of our magazine Two Long, we go instance by instance to work out what Trump's

  2. 0:54 , obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova

    doing across the world and if he's launching a holy war. That's just some of 80 pages in the magazine, because there's more in Two Long than you'd expect. Purchase your copy by clicking the link in the description. So, let's start with a bit of history, because while North Korea is today generally perceived as an economic basket case, this wasn't always the case. In fact, in the first decades after the Korean War, the North Korean economy actually outperformed South Korea. This was in part thanks to copious amounts of aid from its communist allies, China and the Soviet Union, which was then channeled into a Soviet-style command economy centered around heavy industry. According to CIA estimates, by 1960, North Korea was, on a per capita basis, substantially wealthier than its southern neighbor. However, North Korea's growth rates began to slow in the 1960s. This was in part because North Korea's first leader, Kim Il-sung, aligned himself with China after the Sino-Soviet split,

  3. 1:48 , obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova

    prompting a steep reduction in Soviet aid. But, it was also because Kim really doubled down on his policy of Juche, or self-reliance, and minimized trade with the outside world. Many socialist/communist states pursued similar policies, but none to the same degree as North Korea, which even pulled back from the Soviet-led Comecon trade block. Somewhat unsurprisingly, this didn't work, and in the 1970s, North Korea started borrowing heavily on international markets in order to import advanced machinery, which it couldn't produce domestically. But, exports remained weak, and whatever foreign currency North Korea could accumulate was mostly spent on energy imports, especially after 1973 oil crisis, leading to a series of defaults in the mid-1970s. The country didn't really have a financial sector, so to speak, so it didn't experience the sort of financial crisis that sovereign defaults usually engender. But, this did mean that North Korea could no longer borrow on international markets, which limited its access to foreign imports and effectively pushed

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    the country back towards autarky. This is when the gap between North and South Korea really started to open up. But, things then got even worse with the collapse of the Soviet Union around 1990, which put an end to both direct Soviet aid and subsidized Soviet oil. This triggered a severe economic crisis culminating in an appalling famine. Out of a total population of 22 million, somewhere between 300,000 and 3 million people starved to death, with millions more suffering from acute malnutrition. The state receded in this period because it literally lacked the resources to monitor and command the economy. And as the economy began to recover in the 2000s, an informal market-based economy expanded in its place. This was also when Chinese economy was really taking off, which was good news for North Korea, given China is basically the only country it trades with. North Korea doesn't publish its own GDP figures, but estimates from the South Korean Central Bank, the Bank

  5. 3:36 , obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova

    of Korea, suggest that the North Korean economy posted solid GDP growth throughout the early 2000s. However, growth rates slowed in the late 2000s, largely due to gradually escalating UN sanctions after North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006. Growth rates then cratered in the mid-2010s, in large part because China, which had previously helped water down any UN-level sanctions, agreed to substantially stronger sanctions in 2016 and 2017. This meant that the North Korean economy was already in a bit of a state going into the pandemic, which proved utterly ruinous. Trade with China collapsed, taking the economy with it. Deprived of fertilizer and hit by severe typhoons, domestic crop production plummeted, creating widespread food insecurity. North Korea's public health system was, unsurprisingly, unable to cope with the wave of infections that swept through the population. It was such a disaster that at the Party Congress in January 2021, Kim was forced into an utterly unprecedented teary-eyed apology on national television. However, in

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    the years since, the North Korean economy has seemingly roared back to health, with the Bank of Korea estimating more than 3% GDP growth every year since 2023. This is plausibly an underestimate as well, since the expansion of the informal economy in the 2000s, a gap has opened up between the Bank of Korea's GDP estimates and the growth in nighttime light activity, which economists generally consider to be a pretty good proxy for GDP, suggesting the Bank of Korea might actually be understating North Korea's real growth rates. Similarly, more recent nighttime light data from Pyongyang specifically suggests that capital's luminosity has essentially doubled since the pandemic. Kim has also announced the completion of some big-ticket infrastructure projects recently, including last month a number of long-delayed hydroelectric power plants, which have historically accounted for the majority of North Korea's power output. It's obviously not hard data, but foreigners who visited the capital Pyongyang claim that the city is noticeably more developed than

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    it was only a few years ago. So, what's gone right? Well, we see at least three reasons. First, Russia. North Korea has provided arms, troops, and even construction workers to help Russia during its war against Ukraine, which has proved incredibly lucrative for the regime and provided Kim with a much-needed source of foreign currency. Second, China. China is no longer enforcing UN sanctions as stringently as it did in the late 2010s and trade between the countries has duly boomed, which has helped the North Korean economy benefit from what we might describe as spillover effects from China's ongoing economic growth. North Korea has also benefited from what Western policymakers describe as China's overcapacity, which has allowed it to import Chinese solar panels and electric cars at rock-bottom prices. Third, sanctions. Not only are the UN sanctions not being enforced properly, the non-UN sanctions, coordinated mostly by the US and its allies, have also become less effective over time. This is part of

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    a more general story. As the US has imposed sanctions with increasing frequency, the rest of the world has created more and more workarounds to insulate themselves, hence their waning efficacy. Now, of course, it's important not to overstate this. North Korea still has, in dollar terms, a GDP per capita in the low thousands. It's also worth noting that, while Pyongyang might look all right to tourists, the rest of the country is a lot poorer. Nonetheless, as the changing tone between the two most recent party congresses made clear, it's at least true that the economy is doing a lot better than it was and this is probably bad news for anyone who doesn't want an emboldened North Korea. When a story like this breaks, the headlines aren't just fast, they're fragmented. Depending on where you get your news, you might be seeing a completely different version of the same event. So, how are you supposed to know who and what to

  9. 7:12 , obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova

    trust? It can be overwhelming trying to read into language and tone to figure out a particular bias. Well, luckily, Ground News will do all that work for you. Ground News is a website and app that helps you make sense of the complex and ever-changing media landscape. With thousands of articles being thrown at us every single day, it may feel impossible to just understand a story, never mind fully comprehend the bias behind each outlet. Well, Ground News puts all of those articles into one place, finally giving you an effortless way to consume news and digest media bias. And within each article, you can even find comprehensive breakdowns into the ownership, bias distribution, and factuality. Take this story on Xi's recent visit to North Korea, for example. We can see that there are 31 sources currently reporting on it, with most of the coverage coming from the left. Taking a look at the headlines, we're able to understand the differences in reporting

  10. 8:06 , obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova

    on each side, with the left focusing more on regional unease, and the right shifting the emphasis to the apparent strategic maneuvering. And it's not just the stories we see that shape the narrative, it's the ones we don't. With Ground News' blind spot feed, you can see all the stories you might not have seen on your feed, both local and international, keeping you fully informed even outside of your media bubble. And this is so important, as a Duke University study finds that exposure to news blind spots can moderate positions and reduce issue polarization. So, if you want to start questioning the narrative, you can join Ground News today, and using our link, you'll get 40% off their unlimited access vantage plan. All you have to do is subscribe through the link in the description. Go to ground.news/tldr, or scan the QR code on screen, and you'll be supporting an independent news platform working to make the media landscape more transparent.