Intel·ligència artificial Maquinari Semiconductors Memòria RAM DRAM Competència

Crisi de la memòria RAM: la demanda que acusa Samsung, SK Hynix i Micron de pactar preus

Una nova demanda antimonopoli acusa Samsung, SK Hynix i Micron de restringir l’oferta de DRAM convencional mentre els preus pujaven. Gamers Nexus analitza els indicis, la història de càrtels del sector i per què el paral·lelisme empresarial no prova per si sol una conspiració.

Els preus de la memòria han pujat amb una intensitat que ja afecta ordinadors muntats, portàtils, consoles, targetes gràfiques i telèfons. Una nova demanda presentada als Estats Units sosté que no és només el resultat de la demanda d’intel·ligència artificial: acusa Samsung, SK Hynix i Micron d’haver coordinat la reducció de l’oferta de DRAM convencional per elevar els preus.

Gamers Nexus analitza més de cent pàgines de la denúncia, repassa els antecedents del sector i explica el principal obstacle jurídic: tres empreses poden prendre decisions semblants perquè comparteixen els mateixos incentius sense haver pactat il·legalment. La demanda és rellevant, però les acusacions encara s’han de provar.

Què al·lega la nova demanda

La denúncia, presentada com a proposta d’acció col·lectiva, afirma que des de 2022 els tres grans fabricants han restringit l’oferta i fixat preus de DRAM. Segons els demandants, els increments acumulats de determinades memòries convencionals arriben aproximadament al 700% en quatre anys, encara que el percentatge varia molt segons el tipus de xip i el moment de compra.

L’argument no es basa només en el preu. El document destaca diverses característiques que facilitarien la coordinació:

  • un mercat molt concentrat en tres fabricants;
  • un producte relativament homogeni i amb preus transparents;
  • una demanda poc flexible a curt termini;
  • barreres d’entrada enormes per construir fàbriques i dominar el procés;
  • anuncis públics i trobades sectorials que permeten anticipar l’estratègia dels rivals.

Els demandants també assenyalen decisions simultànies: reduir la producció de memòria convencional, prioritzar HBM per a acceleradors d’IA, retirar capacitat de DDR3 i DDR4 i aplicar filtres semblants als compradors que buscaven grans volums.

De la DRAM convencional a l’HBM

La memòria d’alt ample de banda o HBM apila diversos xips de DRAM i els connecta amb una interfície molt ampla. És un component essencial de moltes GPU d’IA perquè permet alimentar els acceleradors amb grans quantitats de dades a alta velocitat.

Quan la demanda d’IA es dispara, els fabricants tenen un incentiu evident per destinar capital, oblies i empaquetatge avançat a l’HBM. Això pot reduir l’oferta disponible per a DDR4, DDR5, LPDDR o GDDR encara que no existeixi cap acord secret.

La demanda considera sospitós que les empreses continuessin limitant la DRAM convencional fins i tot quan aquesta havia passat a oferir marges molt elevats. També cita la decisió de Micron d’abandonar la marca de consum Crucial en un moment especialment rendible i els anuncis de Samsung i SK Hynix sobre ajustos de capacitat.

Aquest patró pot admetre dues lectures. Per als demandants, actuar contra l’interès individual aparent suggereix coordinació. Per a les empreses, una fàbrica no es reconfigura d’un dia per l’altre i la prioritat pot ser complir contractes plurianuals d’HBM o evitar una nova sobreoferta cíclica.

Una acció col·lectiva encara no certificada

Gamers Nexus remarca una precisió jurídica important. El document és una demanda que sol·licita ser tractada com a acció col·lectiva. Fins que el jutge no certifiqui la classe, el procediment representa els demandants identificats, no automàticament tots els compradors dels Estats Units.

La classe proposada inclouria persones i empreses que van comprar indirectament DRAM convencional o productes que la incorporaven des del 26 d’octubre de 2022. La definició citada abasta DDR3, DDR4, DDR5, LPDDR5X, GDDR6 i GDDR7, però exclou l’HBM.

Una denúncia presenta els fets des de la perspectiva de qui acusa. No és una resolució del tribunal ni una prova que els preus s’hagin pactat. Samsung ha qualificat les acusacions d’infundades en declaracions recollides per mitjans, mentre altres fabricants han indicat que estudien el cas.

El sector ja té antecedents de càrtel

La sospita no apareix en el buit. A principis dels anys 2000, el Departament de Justícia dels Estats Units va perseguir una conspiració internacional per fixar preus de DRAM. Samsung, Hynix i altres empreses o directius van admetre conductes il·legals, pagar multes i, en alguns casos, complir penes de presó.

Aquest antecedent demostra que la coordinació és possible i que ja ha existit. No demostra, però, que qualsevol pujada posterior sigui una repetició del càrtel.

De fet, una demanda anterior sobre el període 2016–2018 contra Samsung, SK Hynix i Micron va ser desestimada. El Novè Circuit va confirmar el 2022 que els demandants no havien exposat fets suficients per fer plausible una conspiració segons la llei antimonopoli. El precedent mostra com d’alta és la barrera entre un mercat oligopolístic i un pacte jurídicament demostrable.

Paral·lelisme conscient o acord il·legal

En un oligopoli, cada empresa observa els moviments de les altres. Si una redueix producció i els preus pugen, les rivals poden imitar-la sense parlar-hi. Aquesta conducta s’anomena sovint paral·lelisme conscient i, per si sola, no equival necessàriament a una conspiració.

La teoria de jocs explica per què el resultat pot semblar coordinat. Totes les empreses guanyen si mantenen l’oferta sota control, però cadascuna té l’incentiu de produir més i capturar vendes mentre el preu és alt. Un càrtel necessita mecanismes per detectar i castigar qui se’n desvia; un mercat transparent també pot crear disciplina sense una reunió secreta.

Per superar aquesta ambigüitat, els demandants necessiten «factors addicionals»: comunicacions, compromisos, conductes difícilment explicables de manera independent o patrons que descartin una resposta racional comuna a la mateixa demanda. Les decisions simultànies i l’historial aporten context, però el descobriment de proves serà determinant.

Com arriba la crisi al consumidor

La DRAM forma part de molts productes, no només dels mòduls que compra qui munta un PC. També és dins de mòbils, portàtils, consoles, targetes gràfiques, servidors i equips premuntats. Quan el cost augmenta, els fabricants poden apujar preus, reduir la quantitat de memòria o retardar llançaments.

El vídeo enumera marques que han justificat increments de producte per l’encariment de la memòria. Algunes botigues de PC fins i tot ofereixen muntatges on el client aporta la seva pròpia RAM. Aquestes anècdotes mostren l’abast de la tensió, però no permeten atribuir tota la pujada a una sola causa.

La demanda d’IA, les restriccions de capacitat, els terminis de construcció de fàbriques, l’abandonament de nodes antics i la disciplina després d’anys de sobreoferta poden elevar els preus sense col·lusió. La qüestió judicial és si, a més d’aquests factors, hi va haver un acord.

Conclusions

La nova demanda planteja una acusació greu contra les tres empreses que dominen bona part de la DRAM mundial. L’augment extraordinari de preus, la migració coordinada cap a l’HBM i els antecedents penals fan que el cas mereixi escrutini.

Però una denúncia no és un veredicte. El mateix mercat que facilita un càrtel també produeix decisions paral·leles legítimes: pocs actors, informació pública i incentius gairebé idèntics. El procediment haurà de demostrar alguna cosa més que preus alts i estratègies semblants.

Per als consumidors, la conclusió immediata és més pràctica: la memòria convencional competeix amb la infraestructura d’IA per capital i capacitat fabril. Encara que el tribunal descartés la conspiració, aquesta pressió pot mantenir la RAM cara fins que augmenti l’oferta o es refredi la demanda.

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    Departament de Justícia dels Estats Units History of the criminal DRAM price-fixing cases
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    Quote, "Since 2022, these firms have fixed supply and prices for DRM, engaging in conduct that makes no economic sense absent collusion, and that has driven up the price of conventional DRM approximately 700% in a 4-year period." End quote. This is what a new antitrust lawsuit filed by Beth Dunn, a firm specializing in high-tech antitrust cases, states in its puditive class action complaint against Samsung, SKH, and Micron. The brand new filing for this year highlights how the DRAM market is prone to successful collusion, citing a severe concentration of manufacturers, sales of a commodity product, price transparency via trend force, inelastic demand, astronomical entry barriers, and several opportunities to collude. The suit filed by Beth Dunn, though underscores seemingly coordinated actions between the manufacturers, describing how they simultaneously restricted output, shifted priority to HBM, sheld DDR3 and DDR4, and implemented stricter customer vetting policies, asking potential buyers the same exact questions. The complaint also highlights how due to surging DRAM prices, DRM has actually surpassed HBM's profitability for wafer. While DRAM is used in HBM at multiple dieseS per HBM chip, the legal filing seems to instead site conventional DRM [music] as being higher margin. The plaintiffs contend that by refusing to expand supply in spite of all-time high prices, the manufacturers are openly acting against their own self-interests, stating, quote, "Yet contrary to all economic and business logic, the DM Oligopouloolists each cut conventional DRM supply further with Micron going so far as to shutter its consumer DM business, Crucial, at the most profitable point in its history. Prices continued to rise and still Samsung and Micron continued to squeeze conventional DRM supply simultaneously and publicly directing their resources toward less profitable per die HBM or in some cases simply junking conventional DRAM supply channels altogether. End quote. Even the manufacturers admit that conventional DRAM is now more profitable than HBM which does contain DRM but is a different part. Recently we have seen a rise in uh lower spec legacy memory prices [music] and it is true that conventional DMs um have higher margins versus HPM. [music] >> So yes it is correct that the margins for nonHBM uh today are higher than HPM margins. >> As far as who needs HBM typically it's this guy. >> No HBM for you. I need HBM. >> [laughter] >> Meanwhile, OEMs and system integrators are unable to avoid passing these price increases directly on to consumers. Within the past year, CyberPower PC, HP, Dell, Asus, Lenovo, Acer, Framework, Valve, Nintendo, Sony, Microsoft, and Apple have all [music] updated price increases to their products due to the increased RAM prices. Pre-built PC company Mang Gear even started a BIO RAM program telling customers to bring your own RAM and quote, "We'll build you a complete PC." End quote. Lenovo recently joked in a not so funny way that memory prices would quote never and quote come back down. [music] This filing is currently only considered a puditive class action complaint. While the plaintiffs brought the case intending to make it a class action, it's only an action on

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    behalf of the individuals named in the complaint right now until the judge certifies the case as a class action. If certified, the nationwide injunctive relief class would include, quote, all persons and entities in the United States who indirectly purchased conventional DRM products, including DDR3, 4, 5, LP DDR5X, GDDR6, and 7, and all other DRAM conforming to Jedex specifications, but excluding HBM manufactured by one or more defendants or electronic devices containing such DRAM during the period beginning October 26th, 2022 through the present. which they call the class period. End quote. And they're not the only law firm investigating this. Recently, attorneys at Paul LLP contacted Gamers Nexus to ask us for help explaining the supply chain of semiconductors. While we can't disclose the defendants yet, this firm is also investigating price fixing in the industry and is seeking any US buyers of DDR5 memory to contact them to be a possible plaintiff. Our understanding is also that one of those attorneys on the case was involved in the early 2000s DOJ bust of the DRAM cartel. So, it's heating up for the memory makers and possible plaintiffs include everyone who buys memory, including consumers who indirectly bought it through other products like video cards. Let's dive in to what appears to be a new DRM cartel with some old members. We brought you this deep dive with store.gamersac.net. We're currently running a sale on our store. Our GN15 component mouse mats are currently on sale for $20 with the autographed version down in step at $40. The retro IO themed drink coaster pack that we made with soft 3D components is now marked down to $30 for a pack of four. Our AMP media modmat is on sale for $60 now. Our disappointment t-shirt from this year has its last remaining stock on sale for $18. And our component mouse pad with custom rubber underside and stitching is available for $15. The component mouse mats fit a mouse and keyboard, have an allover print that we made inhouse, and have a yellow rubber underside that we customized with blue stitching for anti- fray. The medium mod mats include an enamel pin, pin out card, and medium-sized rugged work surface for your shop, garage, or office with anti-static strap. The Retro IO coasters are one of my favorites, featuring a floppy drive coaster with a floppy in the slot. Controller coaster with retro colorway, Model M inspired numpad coaster, and the GN logo. These are easily washable in the sink, are a soft material, and are great for catching condensation while adding some flare to your setup. Finally, we just launched our stackable ESD safe AMD CPU holder trays on the store. Each holds six AMD CPUs of the 40x40mm package size, including FM2, FM2 Plus, AM3, AM3+, AM4, and AM5. We're making these at GN with fully in-house 3D modeling, CAD drawings, and printing, including our testing of the anti-static dissipative properties of the printed filament. Our existing team at the office is managing the printing of these, which helps further support our work while

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    giving us some experience in a field we're excited to learn about. Head over to store.gamersac.net And to support this content directly back to it. [music] To understand the present, we need to analyze the past. Samsung, SKHEX, and Micron have a long history of illegal price fixing cartel collusion. We covered this in our hour and a half long deep dive documentary on the original DRM cartel linked below, which also contains some history about what memory is and how it got its start. Starting with actually core memory and rope memory where they would handwave the software through reins. Basically at least 15 manufacturers participated and over 117 employees from the five largest manufacturers alone were involved throughout that collusion period from 1998 to 2002. And just as an aside, there were also earlier alleged collusion periods we talked about. The manufacturers exchanged pricing frequently, upheld price floors, rigged customer auctions, simultaneously restricted output to artificially inflate prices, and even organized coalitions within the cartel to eliminate weaker players. The DOJ then launched its investigation after noticing spiking DRAM prices, as well as in response to industry leaders like Dell, especially at the time, making comments about quote cartel-like behavior end quote. Interestingly, it wasn't until after the DOJ subpoenenaed Micron and Micron applied for the corporate leniency program, basically a snitches don't get stitches from the DOJ program, that the DOJ then subpoenaed Micron's fellow cartel members. Shortly after the DOJ began issuing subpoenas, iuppy's principal memory analyst commented via Computer World, quote, "The major PC vendors really felt they were getting hit by unified action. They thought DRAM suppliers were in collusion to set prices higher, but from the DRAM industry standpoint, they went from losing a horrible amount of money last year to trying to make a little money in the first quarter, end quote, resembling the DM over supply in 2022 that preceded the currently alleged collusion period. Although they paid hundreds of millions of dollars in fines, clearly the manufacturers have done well in the time since. In fact, several of the employees were promoted after the cartel, including one who was involved to CEO of Samsung Europe. While the original cartel was brought to a brief pause and some level of justice, we believe it laid the foundation for the current dominance that the big three manufacturers continue benefiting from today. At the time, SKH Heinix even prophesized the big three one day operating in a legal gray area that allowed the manufacturers to lawfully share prices between one another, stating in 1999, quote, "One of the advantage of being a big three is to have the controlling power over the price and we need to exercise this. One of our concern is that it is against the antirust law to set up a certain cartel price." Andy suggests to encourage Samsung as the initiator. Why not? if they accept. We need to have a communication channel open among the big three or four. Each management should share their concern about pricing while not violating the law. End quote. This is especially

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    concerning considering several cartel participants remained employed well after the DOJ discovered the cartel like Samson's son Wu Lee for example. After the DOJ convicted Lee of violating the Sherman Act, fined him a quarter million dollars and sentenced him to seven to eight months in prison, Samsung promoted the exec to CEO and president of Samsung Europe, a title Lee held until 2015. The point is, we think these companies were more than capable of rebuilding the cartel with all the players who remained in or were [music] promoted to powerful positions post cartel collapse. and now they have experience. More recently, in 2018, Hagen's Burman law firm filed another class action against the manufacturers, citing Gamers Nexus and source material for the memory makers allegedly violating antitrust laws between 2016 and 2018. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the case's dismissal in 2022 on account of insufficient evidence. But maybe now there's enough. [music] >> [music] >> As for the conspiracy period in question today, the new complaint alleges, quote, "Beginning in October 2022 and continuing to the present, defendants have engaged in a coordinated scheme to restrict the supply of commodity DRAM, artificially inflating prices throughout the United States. The scheme has been executed through a series of parallel actions that taken together constitute a comprehensive program of supply management by agreement. End quote. The filing describes how after over supplying the market during the pandemic, the big three manufacturers coordinated supply reductions in late 2022 and early 2023, starting with Skhinex in October and Micron in November. Samsung initially held out. At the time, an industry analyst reported via Reuters stated, quote, "Samsung might be seeing this time as a good opportunity to increase market share, which should help it in the long term at the expense of SKH Highex and Micron." End quote. Instead of competing, though, Samsung ultimately followed suit, announcing its own cuts in April. This is particularly out of character for Samsung, which has historically leveraged its dominance to drive out smaller firms during market downturns. An internal Infinion report from 2001 that we uncovered in our DRAM cartel documentary read, quote, I talked to deer Makoviaak from Samsung. Samsung will proceed to take market share and make life difficult for all weaker competitors. End quote. Another stated, quote, I talked with our friend Makoviaak. They want to kill Hinx and take their market share. They're ready to fight to drive prices down intentionally. The next months might be horrible. End quote. Today's new puditive filing describes how Samsung continued throwing its weight around long after the original cartel period, explaining, quote, "In the 2008 to 2009 downturn, Samsung kept producing and investing while rivals collapsed. Kim, then among the largest DRM makers, declared insolveny in January 2009. Alpa, Japan's last DRM maker, followed into bankruptcy in 2012. Industry commentary described the strategy as winning a game of capex chicken. Samsung publicly refused production cuts in the 2019 downturn as well. End quote. After Samsung allegedly restricted output with the others, the big three manufacturers simultaneously began

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    transferring substantial production capacity and capital away from DRAM and towards HBM, or high bandwidth memory. Throughout 2023 and 2024, the manufacturers continued restricting DRM output in attempts to stabilize prices. According to the complaint, referencing some of the same earnings calls we referenced in our DRAM cartel documentary where we stated that the cartel gets around the no backdoor collusion rule by simply doing it publicly. The DRM restrictions signaled their intentions to competitors through public statements and earnings reports with phrases like supply capex discipline or investment efficiency. In one instance, Micron even stated, quote, "Tool installation and production output will be ramped in line with industry demand growth, which is consistent with our goal to maintain stable bit supply share as well as supply discipline." End quote. The filing points out, quote, "A commitment to hold stable bit supply share is a commitment not to take customers from Samsung or SKHENX made publicly. It assured them of exactly that." End quote. And so to the SLR/Hardware subreddit, a great big we told you so. Maybe you can accuse the multiple law firms of clickbait, too. Anyway, DRM prices were beginning to stabilize by early 2025. At the time, Business Korea reported, quote, "DRAM prices had previously shown double-digit plunges in September, minus 17.07% and November, minus 20.59% last year, then maintained stability for four consecutive months from December before turning upward." End quote. Samsung, SKHX, and Micron also seemingly coordinated an exit from DDR4 around this time, each announcing DDR4's EOL status within a 3-month span of each other. By third quarter 2025, CTE, citing Trend Force, reported that DRAM contract prices had increased by 171.8% year-over-year. The legal complaint explains, quote, a 171% price increase in conventional DRM between quarter 324 and quarter 325, which then continued to increase to approximately 697%, is the single most powerful signal available to induce supply expansion. The simultaneous decision by all three defendants to forego a material commodity supply response is rational only if each is confident the others will likewise refrain and the defendants can therefore ride the surge in prices to record margins and profits. End quote. Meanwhile, the smaller DRAM manufacturers without a stake in the collusion, namely Windbond, NA, and CXMT, the Chinese manufacturer we covered in a separate documentary. We'll link that below. all expanded their output, but these companies have never been part of the big three. The complaint clarifies, quote, "If expansion were unprofitable, the smallest producers with the highest costs would not have posted record results doing so. The only firms for which continued output restraint was profitable were the three co-conspirator defendants, so long as not one of them broke ranks and attempted to take market share from the others." End of quote. Then in October, OpenAI announced its Stargate project in partnership with Samsung and SKINX, claiming the project was targeting quote 900,000 DRAM wafer starts per month end quote which Tom's hardware estimated quote may represent around 40% of total DRM output end quote. Effectively, OpenAI and Sam Alman issued a letter of intent. Samsung and SKH Highex

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    effectively conceded the consumer DRAM market to Micron by committing such a large percentage of their DRAM wafer starts to open AI. At the time, Micron was the only big three manufacturer with a direct to consumer sales channel of any meaningful quantity. Heinox does have Clev, but they don't really sell much of it. And Micron was the only manufacturer with significant capacity for consumer DAM amidst what it called quote the most severe memory supply shortage in more than 40 years. End quote. Rather than capitalize on the all-time high retail prices with its unique positioning, Micron shattered the 29 years worth of goodwill it built with consumers and killed Crucial quote in order to improve supply and support for our larger strategic customers in faster growing segments. End quote. Micron announced its decision only two months after OpenAI's Stargate announcement for the memory purchases that is and the punitive filing contends quote in a competitive market a firm does not abandon a high margin segment at the peak of a price spike particularly where it has an established direct to consumer channel that its rivals lack. It expands into it. That AI data center demand was strong explains why Micron might wish to sell more to data center customers. It does not explain why Micron eliminated its consumer channel rather than supplying it when consumer prices were at record highs and the channel was highly profitable. End quote. The complaint then claims beginning January 2026 that Samsung SKH and Micron simultaneously implemented stricter customer vetting procedures. Tom's Hardware citing Nicay Asia quotes a GPU and server supplier who explained quote the three companies became stricter and asked us about who we will supply to how much quantity and if the demand of our customers are real and quote all three manufacturers beginning to ask the same questions at the same time is a huge red flag of collusion and indicates what we believe is a coordinated effort. The filing notes quote in a competitive market firms differentiate on customer service. they do not simultaneously adopt the same order vetting questions end quote. The complaint continues describing how despite all the claims of quote focusing on profitability and quote while shifting DRAM resources to HBM, DRM actually surpassed HBM's profitability per wafer in early 2026. According to CNBC, quote, "When Micron makes one bit of HBM memory, it has to forego making three bits of more conventional memory for other devices." end quote. Per our own reporting, due to yields and DRAM requirements, HPM can sometimes require 2.3 to three times as much DRAM die area as consumer DDDR7 memory for the same capacity in bits, not counting the extra base logic die and interposer you need for HPM. As explained in the court documents, quote, "The 3:1 ratio implies that HBM is the more profitable use of capacity only if the profit from one HBM bit exceeds the profit from three conventional DRM bits sold into the shortage. Stated as a threshold, a bit of HBM is the better use of a unit of capacity only where

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    the HBM revenue premium per bit multiplied by the HPM margin exceeds three times the ordinary margin proxy." End quote. The complaint cites Micron's second quarter 2026 financials where it reported operating margins of 76% for mobile and client consumer basically 67% for core data center and 66% for cloud memory. In the time since, Micron has posted another quarter that we've already covered in a different video, but in that one, Micron reported an obscenely high consumer memory operating margin of 86% on 87% gross margin. Just one year prior. In the same table, Micron reported 15% operating margin for the same part of its consumer business. Again, now 86%. And that's from the same company that shuttered its consumer memory direct sales channel. But the suit cites the prior quarter with slightly lower margin due to the filing time. Using Micron's reported mobile and client business unit, 7.711 billion quarterly revenue and 76% operating margin, the complaint calculates, quote, the operating profit associated with capturing even a small additional share of that segment's consumer and client demand. End quote. to create some tables and charts. Per the complaint, if Micron increased its consumer sales by 5%, it would have received an additional roughly 293 million in operating quarterly income or an additional $1.17 billion when annualized. That'd be even higher on the Q3 filing. The complaint also calculates a section for the required HBM revenue premium per bit to beat three conventional DRM bits as it corresponds to different HBM margins as shown in this table. At 70% HPM margin, the manufacturer needs a 3.26x revenue premium per HPM bit in order to gain more profit than three conventional DRAM bits. In other words, the manufacturers are leaving substantial profit on the table by not competing for the consumer DRM market, something they chose to not. And even the manufacturers admit that DRAM has now surpassed HBM's profitability. In Samsung's first quarter 2026 earnings call, it stated, >> "Recently, we have seen a rise in uh lower spec legacy memory prices. And it is true that conventional DMs um have higher margins versus stage PM and we are aware of certain outside views that focusing our sales mix on conventional DMs may be more beneficial uh in terms of short-term performance versus HBM. Micron CEO affirmed this in Micron's second quarter 2026 earnings call acknowledging >> so yes it is correct that the margins for nonHBM uh today are higher than HBM margins >> and an SK group chairman reportedly stated through machine translation quote the HBM margin is 60% and the general memory chip margin is 80% end quote as reported by Korean media outlet News1 we think one key factor contributing to this is that HBM contract prices are negotiated annually while DRAMM contract act prices are negotiated quarterly, meaning DRAM prices are going to reflect market changes faster than HBM. The complaint asserts, quote, "AI demand explains why HBM became attractive. It does not explain Samsung's abandonment of its historical Maverick strategy, Micron's exit from Crucial at peak consumer prices or the uniform refusal

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    by all three defendants to expand commodity DM supply in response to record commodity prices." End quote. Finally, the document concludes by explaining how the DRM industry's characteristics make it particularly susceptible to successful collusion, citing the extremely concentrated market, sales of commodity products, price transparency from trend forces, contract price reports, inelastic demand, insurmountable entry barriers, and numerous colluding opportunities. [music] >> [music] >> A lot of the alleged collusion today comes down to the market dynamics between competitors in the DRM industry, which Soyon Lee describes well in his report titled chicken game analysis on global competition. Using the concepts of game theory, Lee illustrates how each manufacturer has the choice to either expand or maintain or reduce capacity. If two manufacturers exist and both manufacturers expand capacity, the result is an overupp and both receive lower profits. If one expands while the other maintains, the manufacturer who expands earns higher profits and market share. If both manufacturers choose to maintain, however, each walks away with a moderate payout. Pretty basic stuff. Of course, in a perfectly competitive market, you don't know how your competitor is going to play the game. Additionally, if you somehow knew your competitor planned to maintain or reduce capacity, like say if they stated something like our DRM waiver starts will remain significantly below 2022 levels for the foreseeable future in the earnings report, you'd expand capacity to earn higher profits and seize market share from your competition. Unfortunately, while it certainly appears like the manufacturers are choosing to not compete from our perspective anyway, the manufacturers could claim that this is simply conscious parallelism. Cornell Law School defines this market tactic, stating, quote, "Conscious parallelism refers to businesses changing their prices to reflect the prices of competitors within a market without colluding or communicating with competitors." Unlike price fixing, which involves conscious agreement between competitors and violating antitrust laws, conscious parallelism occurs where businesses just change prices in reaction to competitors. And conscious parallelism does not constitute illegal activity on its own. End quote. >> [music] >> This is actually somewhat related to why the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the prior DRAM antitrust lawsuit filed in 2018. The court's decision read, quote, "Plaintiff's factual allegations do not amount to the something more required to support a plausible inference of conspiracy. Dismissal of plaintiff's claims premised on an alleged agreement between defendants was therefore proper." End quote. The current complaint, the new one, addresses this aspect from the previously failed case, stating, quote, "The 2016 to 2018 litigation was ultimately unsuccessful. Unlike the present action, the 2018 complaint alleged only parallel pricing without identifying unlawful coordinated conduct as set forth here. Simultaneous production cuts, coordinated product line exits, used equipment withdrawal by Samsung and SKH, and parallel customer vetting among other specific facts and conduct explained in this complaint. End quote. For context, Thompson Reuters described section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act, what the plaintiffs alleged the manufacturers violated, by saying this, quote, "Every contract combination in the form of trust or otherwise or

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    conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal. If read literally, section one of the Sherman Act would prohibit every commercial contract because all contracts cause some restraint on trade. Fortunately, courts have found that only agreements that unreasonably restrain trade are prohibited. End quote. According to George Washington University Law School, we found this explainer. Quote, "Courts allow a collusive agreement to be established by circumstantial evidence, but the evidence must show additional evidence, plus factors beyond parallel movement and price." End quote. Thompson Reuters describes that some of the plus factors typically accepted in addition to parallel movements, stating, quote, "Plus factors include the defendants acted contrary to their individual economic interests. The defendants had meetings or conversations, i.e. opportunities to agree, the defendants had a motive to collude, engaged in abrupt or unprecedented changes in behavior, and the industry is concentrated with few competitors." End quote. We believe that each of those factors, the plus factors, exist in this case, but that's not for us to decide. Ultimately, we'd like to see more from the DOJ here, like in the early 2000s, but the current DOJ is uh busy finding a replacement. >> One word about Jeffrey Epstein. How ironic is that? You know why? Because Donald Trump, the Dow, the Dow right now is over. The Dow is over $50,000. I don't know why you're laughing. You're a great stock trader. >> Our understanding is that the consumers never would have discovered the original DRAM cartel had the DOJ not subpoenaed the manufacturers in response to both the increasing prices and the cartel-like allegations from industry leaders. To our knowledge, the DOJ hasn't investigated the DRM manufacturer since. Be a Don LLP. The firm who submitted this puditive complaint isn't the only law firm investigating the DRAM manufacturers for price fixing right now. It's heating up. Similarly, a cross- sector trade association recently sent a letter to the secretaries of the US Treasury and Commerce departments regarding quote an urgent imbalance in the market for memory chips that could lead to significant and sustained near-term price increases for American households and disrupt critical US supply chains. End quote. The letter signed by several national industry associations urged the US White House and its administration to among other requests quote ensure that memory semiconductor capacity adequately serves all segments of the market including consumerf facing and manufacturing industries and to quote closely track conditions in the memory market including with respect to supply and demand end quote. In the DOJ's Red Flags of Collusion, it describes its four-part maps analysis, explaining how you can analyze an industry's market, applications, patterns, and suspicious behavior to detect collusion. Starting with the market aspect, the DOJ states, quote, "The award may be the target of collusion if there are few competitors in the market that offer a good or service. A small group of major vendors controls a large share of the market. The good or service is standardized so that the determining factor in the award

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    is price. rather than other competitive factors such as design, quality, or service." End quote. All of these factors again exist in the DRM market. Moving to the application section, it asks, quote, "Are there similarities between vendor applications or proposals?" End quote. And while the DOJ doesn't explicitly mention it in its examples, we would consider the manufacturers simultaneously implementing stricter customer vetting procedures and asking the same exact questions as both a similarity between vendor applications and suspicious behavior. The post concludes, quote, "If you notice any combination of these red flags, you should report your concerns to the antitrust division." End quote. While we don't think there's currently any explicit evidence of collusion, we think the amount of seemingly coordinated actions, the unprecedented price increases and the amount of consumers who purchase electronics with RAM should be more than enough for the DOJ to at least investigate the market for anti-competitive practices. Of course, it's not like the US antitrust agencies currently have any reason to turn a blind eye to this sort of behavior. Say, for example, if something ridiculous happened, like the executive branch were to garner good PR with hundreds of millions of dollars of donations for a memory maker and likewise grant billions of dollars of tax breaks while also enacting control over the DOJ as the executive branch, or at least it seems that way. But that would be ridiculous. >> This is critical capability. >> So, this filing is currently in the earliest possible stages, and the judge is yet to certify this puditive class action complaint as a legitimate class action lawsuit. If the judge certifies the puditive filing as a class action, the defendants will likely file a motion to dismiss. If that fails, the case then enters the discovery period, which is what they would really want to avoid. For additional reference, the original DRAM antitrust litigation filed in 2002 required nearly 12 years between the plaintiffs initially filing the case and the court granting the final approval of settlements. It'll take a while to see how this plays out, but we'll be here to cover it, even if it's 12 years from now, but hopefully it's sooner. That's it for this one. You should watch our DRAM cartel history piece that we posted previously. We'll link that in the description, and you should open another tab for our rise of Chinese memory content about CXMT, a new competitor to these big three. You can directly support our work by going to store.gamersex.net net and picking up one of our shirts such as our GPU shredder shirt and we have more micro slop shirts on the way into the warehouse. Those have continued to sell through, so thank you. You can also get one of our retro.io coaster packs hearkening back to a better time when not everything was a cloud-based and shitified service. Or you can head over to patreon.com/gamers nexus to throw a few bucks our way each month. Thanks for watching. Thanks for your support. Subscribe for more. And we'll see you all next time.